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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

DPP v Hope (No 3); DPP v Hope

Citation:

[2024] ACTSC 261

Hearing Date:

15 August 2024

Decision Date:

23 August 2024

Before:

Christensen AJ

Decision:

See [42]

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – DRUG AND ALCOHOL SENTENCING LIST – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – imposition or resentence following s 80ZE cancellation of a drug and alcohol treatment order – breaches of treatment order – no compliance with treatment order – further offending – sentence of imprisonment imposed

Legislation Cited:

Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) s 120
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005
(ACT) s 80ZE
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 308, 311, 312, 318

Cases Cited:

DPP v Djerke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 341
DPP v Stewart (No 2)
[2024] ACTSC 163
Hogan v Hinch
[2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506
R v Cook (No 2)
[2024] ACTSC 27
DPP v Hope (Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Refshauge AJ, 6 December 2023)
DPP v Hope (No 2) (Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Hopkins AJ, 16 February 2024)

Parties:

Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)

Steven Mark Hope (Offender)

Representation:

Counsel

D Armstrong (Crown)

C Duffy (Offender)

Solicitors

ACT Director of Public Prosecutors

Legal Aid ACT (Offender)

File Numbers:

SCC 195 of 2023

SCC 195 of 2024

CHRISTENSEN AJ:

Introduction

1․ Steven Hope is to be sentenced in relation to an offence of aggravated burglary contrary to s 312(a) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Criminal Code) and an offence of driving a motor vehicle without consent contrary to s 318(2) of the Criminal Code.

2․ The drive motor vehicle without consent offence was committed on 14 March 2023.

3․ On 6 December 2023, Mr Hope was sentenced for offences committed on 4 April 2023, being an offence of burglary contrary to s 311 of the Criminal Code and an offence of theft contrary to s 308 of the Criminal Code.  Mr Hope was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 18 months, to be served by way of a drug and alcohol treatment order (treatment order).

4․ On 11 January 2024, Mr Hope committed the offence of aggravated burglary.

5․ His treatment order was cancelled on 16 February 2024: DPP v Hope (No 2) (Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Hopkins AJ, 16 February 2024) (DPP v Hope (No 2)).  Mr Hope is now to be sentenced in relation to the offences of aggravated burglary and driving a motor vehicle without consent (the sentence offences) and the review process is to be finalised, requiring a decision as to whether to impose the custodial part of the drug and alcohol sentence order that was suspended, or to resentence (Treatment Order Review).

Treatment Order Review

6․ The offences the subject of the treatment order involved Mr Hope entering a business premises and stealing electronic equipment valued at $5,500.00.

7․ The treatment order required Mr Hope to attend at Canberra Recovery Services to engage in a residential rehabilitation program upon his release from custody on 6 December 2023.  Mr Hope absconded within a period of eight hours.  A warrant was issued for his arrest, and he was arrested on 16 January 2024. The review of his treatment order was commenced, and Mr Hope was remanded in custody.

8․ On 16 February 2024, the treatment order was cancelled pursuant to ss 80ZE (1)(c), (d) and (f) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act), being that there were unsatisfactory circumstances warranting cancellation.  At the time of cancellation, Mr Hope had not been charged with the 11 January 2024 offence.

Consideration

9․ The Court’s consideration at this stage is whether to impose the sentence of imprisonment that was suspended under the custodial part of the treatment order, or, if considered appropriate in the circumstances, to resentence: s 80ZE(2) Sentencing Act; and see R v Cook (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 27 at [10]. It is relevant to note that “the terms of s 80ZE of the Sentencing Act may tend towards a conclusion of legislative intent that, subject to the extent of compliance and in the absence of circumstances warranting resentence, there is a “default” of imposition”: DPP v Stewart (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 163 at [27].

10․ Mr Hope’s compliance with the treatment order is able to be accurately described in simple terms, namely, that there was none.  While it may be that Mr Hope has an explanation for this, being that he panicked upon his release from custody, it is plain that there was complete noncompliance.  This readily favours imposition.

11․ As to whether it is appropriate in the circumstances to resentence, there have been no gains towards rehabilitation, nor any other identifiable compelling circumstances, that would lead to a conclusion that resentence is appropriate. In addition to the immediate noncompliance with the treatment order, Mr Hope re-offended during the period he was absconding, and, rather than make any efforts to rectify his noncompliance and abscondment, Mr Hope was returned to the court through arrest.

12․ The only appropriate approach in all of the circumstances is one of imposition.  No submissions pressing a different conclusion were made.  A total period of 18 months imprisonment is to be imposed.

Sentence offences

Aggravated burglary (CAN 2024/2290) – 11 January 2024

13․ As to the offending that occurred during the treatment order, Mr Hope pleaded guilty to entering the South Point Tuggeranong shopping centre in Greenway with intent to commit theft.  This is an aggravated form of the offence as he was in the company of another person, an unidentified female. The facts provide that Mr Hope and the other person forced open sliding doors that went to an upper courtyard area of the shopping centre.

14․ Once inside the shopping centre, they went to a store named ‘Fricken Chicken’ and attempted to force entry though the locked door using metal implements.  While there is no charge, or particular in the charge, in relation to this conduct, I infer from the agreed facts that this is to be considered as forming part of the aggravated burglary in a ‘rolled up’ sense.

15․ In the process of attempting to force entry to the Fricken Chicken store, Mr Hope inadvertently pressed a security button.  This activated a security camera and alerted the owner of the store. About one minute later, after failing to access the store, Mr Hope and the other person fled the shopping centre through the sliding doors that they had entered from.  The owner of Fricken Chicken notified police, which led to a police investigation that identified Mr Hope’s role from closed circuit television (CCTV) footage.

16․ The facts do not set out any damage caused to the Shopping Centre sliding doors, but do provide that the attempt to open the doors of Fricken Chicken caused damage to the door frame, door handle, door lock mechanism, and the door.  The cost to repair this damage is not provided.

17․ As already observed, this offence was committed whilst Mr Hope was subject to the treatment order.  This is aggravating in terms of determining the appropriate sentence.  It is of particular concern that the nature and circumstances of the offending are similar to that involved in the offending the subject of the treatment order.

18․ That is, once again, Mr Hope entered a commercial premises out of hours with a view to stealing property.  Entering a premises at a time when there is likely to be persons present, and thus personally confronted by the offending, is not an aggravating feature present in the sentence offending or the previous offending.  But, the repeat behaviour of this type leads to a conclusion that a strongly deterrent sentence is warranted.

19․ Even without any individual victims present during the offending behaviour, there will have been impacts on the business owners and employees.  Financial impacts, inconvenience, and likely emotional distress will have been caused.

20․ Further, in assessing the objective seriousness, there was damage caused as a result of some of the conduct, and there was seemingly a level of planning given the use of metal implements to attempt entry.  It was though, overall, unsophisticated offending.  The circumstance of aggravation involves Mr Hope being with one other offender.

Drive motor vehicle without consent (CAN2024/4855) – 14 March 2023

21․ The drive motor vehicle without consent offence occurred quite some time before the treatment order was imposed.  The offending involved Mr Hope driving a Nissan Pathfinder that had been stolen between 10pm on Saturday 11 March 2023 and 8am on Sunday 12 March 2023 from the front of a residence in Theodore.

22․ On Sunday 19 March 2023, police attended at the United service station in Kambah in response to a report that the vehicle had been dumped at that location for a number of days.  CCTV footage from the service station showed that on Tuesday 14 March 2023, Mr Hope drove the vehicle to the service station.  The vehicle was left at the side of the station.  Shortly after, Mr Hope left the service station in another vehicle.  Subsequent forensic examination and analysis found Mr Hope as being a contributor to a DNA profile on the driver controls of the vehicle.

23․ Any driving of a motor vehicle without consent is serious.  It warrants that sentencing purposes which give effect to the community concern for such offending are reflected in the sentence imposed.  It is only because there is a willingness by some to drive a vehicle taken without consent that vehicles are stolen.  The lack of regard for other community members, who have experienced the inconvenience, distress, and financial impacts from the theft of their vehicle, is to be denounced and deterred, and offenders who engage in such conduct must be held accountable for their actions.

24․ Mr Hope’s driving of this particular stolen vehicle did not, fortunately, appear to result in any additional impact beyond the theft that occurred, with the vehicle having been recovered.  The duration of the driving itself, by this offender, was short, within a period of some eight days that the owner of the vehicle was without his vehicle.  The driving itself otherwise lacks any aggravating features.

Subjective circumstances

25․ Mr Hope is now aged 46 years.  He was aged 44 and 45 years at the time of the sentence offending.

26․ His subjective circumstances are set out in detail in the original sentence remarks: DPP v Hope (Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Refshauge AJ, 6 December 2023). That unpublished decision is incorporated as a schedule to these reasons.

27․ The subjective circumstances include that he had, as previously described, “an unremarkable childhood”, [redacted] parents and a younger brother in Adelaide.  Mr Hope completed school up to year 10 and has been independent of the family home since he was 16 years of age.  He has been employed in a range of areas including a retail shop, a timber mill, fishing trawlers, and bricklaying.

28․ Mr Hope has had some physical health challenges arising from a significant motor vehicle collision about 15 years ago, but reports no mental health challenges.  He has had a significant substance abuse disorder that began from when he was 16 years of age with cannabis, and progressed to heroin use in his early twenties.  The original sentence decision describes this as “long and entrenched drug use”.

29․ Mr Hope has had two significant relationships and has three older children.  His previous motivation in seeking drug and alcohol rehabilitation was to reconnect with his children.  I suspect it is likely that such a motivation, for the same reason, remains.  Other than the treatment order, Mr Hope has not had many opportunities to engage in supported rehabilitation.  He is now at an age and stage of life where such opportunities are more likely to be embraced:  DPP v Djerke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 341 at [23].

Criminal history

30․ As observed in the original sentence decision, Mr Hope has a “long and significant criminal history”.  It includes primarily dishonesty offences, with previous offences of burglary in 2018 and 2009, and a previous offence of taking and driving a motor vehicle without consent in New South Wales in 2013.  His criminal history spans many years, multiple jurisdictions, and has included numerous orders for imprisonment, and noncompliance with community based orders.

Maximum penalties

31․ The aggravated burglary offence carries a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment, 2000 penalty units, or both.

32․ The drive motor vehicle without consent offence carries a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment 500 penalty units, or both.

Pleas of guilty

33․ In relation to both offences the subject of sentence, Mr Hope entered a plea of guilty at any early stage in the Magistrates Court.  A reduction in the range of 25 per cent is appropriate, reflective of the utilitarian value of the pleas.

34․ The pleas of guilty could not though be said to demonstrate any remorse, nor is there any apparent insight into the offending.  This is not to say that Mr Hope lacks either remorse or insight, but rather, that it is not demonstrated on the information before me.

Consideration

35․ I am satisfied in relation to both sentence offences that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate.  The aggregate term of imprisonment to be imposed is such that a nonparole period is to be set.

36․ The original sentence decision, in terms of both the sentence imposed for the burglary, and, to an extent, the current sentencing practice considered therein, has been informative as to the appropriate penalty for the sentence offence of aggravated burglary.

37․ The totality principle has also been informative, and has led me to a conclusion that cumulative sentences are appropriate for the distinct sentence offences, committed at different times, but that a level of moderation in the terms to be imposed, and the period of ineligibility for parole, is appropriate.

38․ The prosecution submitted that “the court and community have spent enough time and resources attempting to rehabilitate the offender and that those attempts have been met with not only no success, but with blatant disregard and contempt to those attempts”.  I would not express this sentiment in those terms, preferring to express it as an observation that, as Hopkins AJ observed in the decision to cancel the treatment order, Mr Hope is “not yet in a position to embrace” the opportunity given for rehabilitation: DPP v Hope (No 2).  As Hopkins AJ observed, Mr Hope did not at that time have the strength to engage with the healing required.

39․ But this does not mean this time will not come.  Mr Hope’s original motivation to rehabilitate remains.  He is also clearly someone of capability having regard to his employment history, particularly so when he is abstinent from illicit substance abuse, which he has been in the past while employed.  During his most recent period in custody, Mr Hope has engaged in courses directed towards employment, and he has intentions to engage in longer term courses, including for drug rehabilitation, once his sentence period is known.

40․ Nonetheless, it remains that community protection needs to be reflected in the sentence.  In doing so, it is relevant to recognise that “rehabilitation, if it can be achieved, is likely to be the most durable guarantor of community protection”: Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 at [32].  A parole period that enables lengthy supervision in the community, and an opportunity for rehabilitation, will meet this sentencing purpose.

Presentence custody

41․ The sentence to be imposed is appropriately backdated to take into account a total of 262 days spent in custody prior to the imposition of the treatment order (24 October 2023 – 6 December 2023), during the term of the Treatment Order (16 January 2024 – 16 February 2024), and on remand since cancellation (17 February 2024 – 23 August 2024).

Orders

42․ For those reasons the following orders are made:

(1)       The cancellation of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order dated 6 December 2023 be confirmed.

(2)       The conviction of Steven Mark Hope of burglary – intent to steal (CAN 4261/2023) be confirmed and the sentence of 14 months imprisonment be imposed to commence from 5 December 2023 and end on 4 February 2025.

(3)       The conviction of Steven Mark Hope of theft (CAN 7372/2023) be confirmed and the sentence of 9 months imprisonment be imposed to commence from 5 September 2024 and end on 4 June 2025.

(4)       Steven Mark Hope be convicted of drive motor vehicle without consent (CAN 4855/2024) and he be sentenced to 4 months, 15 days imprisonment, reduced from 6 months imprisonment on account of his plea of guilty, to commence from 5 June 2025 and end on 19 October 2025.

(5)       Steven Mark Hope be convicted of aggravated burglary (CAN 2290/2024) and he be sentenced to 13 months, 15 days imprisonment, reduced from 18 months imprisonment on account of his plea of guilty, to commence from 20 October 2025 and end on 4 December 2026.

(6)       The total term of imprisonment is 3 years, commencing from 5 December 2023 and ending on 4 December 2026.

(7)       A nonparole period be imposed to commence from 5 December 2023 and end on 4 October 2025.

(8)       Under s 120(1)(a) of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), it be recommended to the Sentence Administration Board that:

(a)       When released on parole, Steven Mark Hope be required as a condition of the parole to undertake a substantial period of supervised or mandated drug rehabilitation, preferably in a residential drug rehabilitation facility, if a program is available to him.

 

I certify that the preceding forty-two [42] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Acting Justice Christensen

Associate:

Date: 29 April 2025

Schedule: DPP v Hope (Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Refshauge AJ, 6 December 2023)

The Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List is based on the advantage to the community of the rehabilitation of an offender whose dependence on drugs, including alcohol, has substantially contributed to his or her crime. The rationale is simply that if that criminogenic risk can be satisfactorily addressed, as has been shown for many years that it can, then the achievement of the objectives of the criminal law is assured.

The courts have said on many occasions that the ultimate purpose of punishment, which is the proper response to crime, is the protection of the community; Boulton v The Queen, Clements v The Queen, Fitzgerald v The Queen. Achieving that rehabilitation is an important means of achieving that purpose. As French CJ said in Hogan v Hinch:

Rehabilitation, if it can be achieved, is likely to be the most durable guarantor of community protection and is clearly in the public interest.

This approach has been accepted and applied a number of times in this jurisdiction; see R v Hill, R v EN, R v Hagan, R v Campbell (No 2). Other jurisdictions have also accepted it; see, for example, JF v The Queen. A significant option for rehabilitation by which to address the criminogenic risks provided by dependency on drugs and alcohol is the drug and alcohol treatment order under section 12A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 of the ACT, ‘Sentencing Act’ established in 2019.

Steven Mark Hope has pleaded guilty to offences of burglary and theft and requested that any sentence of imprisonment be served by a treatment order. The prosecution, very professionally represented by Ms E Priestley tendered without objection the required prosecution tender bundle. Behind the prescribes and very helpful cover sheet, it contained the certificate under section 90A of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 of the ACT, an agreed statement of facts, Mr Hope’s criminal history and a letter dated 6 October 2023 from the intake officer of Canberra Recovery Services.

As Mr Hope had sought that a treatment order be made, a drug and alcohol treatment assessment under section 46J of the Sentencing Act had been directed to be prepared. The reports were prepared and included in the prosecution tender bundle. These were the drug and alcohol treatment assessment dated 22 November 2023 of ACT Corrective Services and the drug and alcohol sentencing suitability assessment report dated 27 November 2023 for the alcohol and drug services, together with a case plan.

There was no challenge to the contents of any of the material in the prosecution tender bundle. Ms Priestley and Ms G Le Couteur, who appeared very ably for Mr Hope, provided written submissions which were of great assistance to the court. Both counsel engaged respectfully and helpfully in debate with the court and answered questions. This was of critical value in identifying the issues. From this material, the court makes the following findings.

The facts

It’s imperative that the facts that are said to show that an offence has been committed are found by the court. The judge’s function is to find those facts which is obviously considerably helped by the fact of agreement between the parties, as here, with an agreed statement of facts. That, however, does neither obviate the obligation of the court to find the facts, nor fetter the discretion of the judge in that role. Such a discretion, however, must be exercised judicially.

At about 10.38 pm on 4 April 2023, Mr Hope entered the offices of a business in Phillip, ACT as a trespasser. There was no evidence of any damage he caused either on entry or while on the premises. The incident was largely captured on the office’s closed circuit television, CCTV system. Mr Hope stole two computers and their power sources, six mobile phones, and a set of car keys. The property was valued at $5,500. There was no evidence that those car keys were used on the car or indeed for which car they were the keys. Later that day, Mr Hope attended Tuggeranong police station. The evidence does not disclose why he did so. It may be because at the time he was on bail for some earlier matters, later dealt with in the ACT Magistrates Court on 5 October 2023. Bail mentioned below.

Nevertheless, he was shown on the CCTV from that attendance dressed in the same clothes as earlier. Police executed a search warrant on Mr Hope’s premises. They found, in addition to the track pants that he appeared to have been wearing during the burglary as shown on the CCTV footage, two of the stolen mobile phones and a laptop bag. It’s not quite clear what was the relevance of the bag as it was not on the evidence asserted Mr Hope had stolen any. Plus a small amount of the stolen property was actually recovered. Mr Hope was arrested on 29 April 2023.

The proceedings

After his arrest, Mr Hope was refused bail by police. It is not clear why he was not brought before the court before, but he appeared in the ACT Magistrates Court on 1 May 2023. He was charged with the current offences and some other offences committed on other days. He was remanded in custody. On 10 April 2023, after four adjournments, he indicated that he was prepared to plead guilty and after a short adjournment, he pleaded guilty to the charges now before this court. He was committed for sentence. He remained in custody.

On 5 October 2023, Mr Hope was sentenced for five offences committed on various dates between 7 July 2021 and 29 April 2023 in the Magistrates Court. He was sentenced to a total six months imprisonment from 24 April 2023 to 23 October 2023. In this court, he appeared on 22 September 2023, when he was assessed as eligible for preparation of suitability assessments which were ordered and a sentence date set. He has now been in custody since 24 April 2023.

For six of those months, he has been in custody as a sentence prisoner so that period does not count toward the pre sentence custody that must be taken into account on sentence under section 63(2) of the Sentencing Act if the court directs that the sentence starts earlier than the date on which it is imposed; R v Poi. The court should ordinarily exercise its discretion to backdate a sentence unless there are good reasons not to do so, and explicit reasons should be given; see R v Elphick (No 2). There is no reason not to do so in this case. Accordingly, the 44 days of pre sentence custody will be taken into account.

The offences

While it’s essential to make findings about the facts of the offences, it’s also essential to identify the objective seriousness of each crime. This is part of the two primary factors that courts sentencing offenders are required to address at the common law; R v Killick. Since 2005, the Sentencing Act has set out in section 33 the factors for which a court sentencing an offender is required to have regard. The objective seriousness is there described as the nature and circumstances of the offence; section 33(1a) of the Sentencing Act. It also involves, in part, what is described as current sentencing practice; section 33(1za) of the Sentencing Act.

In order to identify this, there are three matters. The first, namely the facts of the offence, have already been considered. Second is the maximum penalty for the offence, a matter almost always required to be taken into account; Park v The Queen. It almost always will be required to be considered because it is what the legislature has prescribed. It invites comparison between the worst category of case and taken and balanced with all the other factors provides a yard stick. Then, the third matter is the identification and comparison with particular factors that courts have recognised of those relevant to show how the actual offence committed in this instance is an aggravated or mitigated version of the offence. They can, of course, be committed in so many ways and under so many circumstances.

Burglary is an offence prohibited by section 311 of the Criminal Code 2002 of the ACT which provides for a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment or a fine of $224,000 or both. It is, thus, a serious crime for which a sentence of imprisonment is usually imposed. As to the particular factors to be considered, these have often been considered by the courts. They are helpfully identified in R v Hancock after consideration of a number of authorities. This identification has been followed in a number of cases; see Williams Savage v The Queen, R v Clissold, R v DP (a pseudonym). It's not necessary to list the factors there identified but to refer to those which are relevant here.

The property into which Mr Hope entered as a trespasser with intent to steal was not a residential property, which would have made it more serious, but commercial premises. It was entered at a time when it would not be expected that there would be occupants there and there were none, avoiding a confrontation which would also have made a more serious version of the offence. There was no evidence of any damage done on entry, nor while Mr Hope was in the premises, as noted above.

The motivation was to steal property. There seems to be little premeditation and no evidence of particular planning, and none was alleged. The property does not seem to have been particularly targeted and there was no evidence such as might have been provided had there been a victim impact statement of any particular effect of the burglary, other than what can generally be understood by the court to have been suffered. This was a relatively unremarkable version of a relatively serious offence.

Theft is made a crime under section 308 of the Criminal Code and attracts a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment or a fine of $160,000 or both. It is, thus, a less serious offence than the burglary but still serious. A sentence for the offence when committed with a burglary is generally made substantially if not wholly, concurrent with the sentence for the burglary; see Dawson v The Queen. The primary factor in assessing the objective seriousness is the value of the property taken; see R v Weir. Here, the property stolen was valued at $5,500. This is not an inconsiderable sum but by no means, inconsequential. The value, however, is not limited to the monetary value.

Were there property that had a personal or sentimental value, that could also be significant; see R v Hawkins. There is also other non monetary value that is relevant, such as the inconvenience caused by the loss of the property; see R v Forest (No 2). Thus here, the loss of computers can be highly inconvenient for a business. They often have data stored on them and are used usually and regularly in a business for the conduct of the work of the business and are essential for that purpose every day. That the phones were there during the evening suggests that they may not have had such a personal value, but it would also be inconvenient to lose them for the operation of the business. Even where replaced, the loss would have significant nuisance value in the loss of stored telephone numbers otherwise regularly used and the like. The loss of the car keys would also cause much inconvenience and the replacement can be expensive.

Finally, the fact that so far as the evidence shows, most of the property was not recovered; see R v Forest (No 3). While two of the six stolen phones were recovered, most of the stolen property was lost to the owner or owners. All in all, the theft there was not in the very serious category, but certainly was more serious than many such offences seen in both the value taken and the likely inconvenience caused.

Subjective circumstances

The other primary consideration in sentencing under the common law is the personal circumstances of the offender. This is included in section 33(1m) of the Sentencing Act but also in some of the other paragraphs of that section. Mr Hope was born 45 years ago in Adelaide, South Australia and [redacted]. He has a younger brother. He reports an unremarkable childhood and still has contact with his family, but only when he is in the community. They, understandably, ‘do not approve of his current life choices’ and have not contacted [him] while he is in custody. They currently live in Queensland.

He completed school up to year 10 but moved out of home when he was 16 years old and has remained independent since then. He was keen on sport at school, but a knee injury stopped his participation. Mr Hope has had two significant relationships from which there are three children aged from 16 years to 24 years old. He has not had contact with them for many years but would like to reconnect with them. This is one of the motivations for him seeking rehabilitation.

He has had a significant range of employment. After school, he started as a cleaner at a retail shop for about three years. At age 19, he became employed in a timber mill. He maintained that employment for about seven years. He then decided to transition into a new line of work and joined the fishing trawlers at Port Lincoln, South Australia. He worked in seven month intervals for about four years. This was the most fulfilling period of his life, and he maintained abstinence from illicit drugs for this period. He has hopes of re engaging in this type of employment when practical.

It is interesting but not a basis for any finding, but this business is mentioned in one of the suitability assessments but not at all in the other. In the other, he reports that he conducted his own business as a bricklayer about 10 years ago and worked for about five years. This work is not mentioned at all in the other suitability assessment.

While in the Alexander Maconochie Centre, he has had employment. Records show that he has been a sweeper since May this year. They reported to one of the authors of the suitability assessment that his role was delivering meals. It’s not necessary to resolve these discrepancies, save to say that he has had significant employment both in and out of custody.

Mr Hope relocated from South Australia in about 2004 and this is consistent with his criminal record. It is not clear when he relocated to Canberra but his last offence in Queensland or Tweed Heads was committed in November 2015 and his first offence in Canberra was August 2016. He appears to have remained in Canberra since then.

Mr Hope was involved in a significant motor vehicle collision about 15 years ago. It caused significant frontal lobe injury, and this has led to him suffering seizures. He reports, however, that he has had no seizures since 2004. He has no problems with his mental health. His drug use is long standing but did not commence at a particularly early age. His first drug use was when he started smoking cannabis at age 16 years. He used weekly until his recent arrest. He mainly used it in social settings. He commenced drinking alcohol in his late teens or early twenties but gave up when he became a regular user of heroin. He says he no longer likes the taste or effects of alcohol and prefers heroin as it is ‘more mellow’.

His heroin use commenced when he was in his early twenties. He originally used opioid pain relief but found heroin ‘cleaner and a better high’. He used about half a gram daily without which he would feel unwell. When he had money, he would use up to 2 grams daily. He was using heroin on the day of his offending. This is his drug of choice. He has used OxyContin unprescribed, especially when other opioids were not available, initially when he was 13 years old, but has not used for about 15 years. He has used unprescribed benzodiazepines, but they have become problematic as he has misused them. The precise timing is unclear, but it appears that he has not used them for many years.

He has used methamphetamine or amphetamine in social settings occasionally, but was recorded on 28 April 2023 disclosing using two points of methamphetamine daily. Mr Hope has experienced multiple overdoses of heroin over the years, two of which he believes were in Canberra. One appears to have been in 2016.

Mr Hope has done some opioid maintenance therapy and has currently prescribed a monthly injection of Buvidal. He is prescribed methadone and also buprenorphine. Other than this, he has not had any alcohol, tobacco or other drug treatment. He has had limited periods of abstinence. He did, however, express a very keen interest in some rehabilitation.

Mr Hope has had a long and significant criminal history. His record commenced in South Australia [redacted]. [Redacted].

[Redacted], he has accumulated 84 findings of guilt or convictions. His first experience of imprisonment was in 2005, but the term was suspended. He did serve his full term of [redacted] imprisonment in 2010 when a sentence of imprisonment was cancelled. The majority of his offending has been offences of dishonesty, including 20 offences of stealing, including minor theft. He has also shown significant failures to honour his obligations on bail, including five offences of failing to appear in accordance with his bail undertakings. He has two burglary, or burglary like offences on his record [redacted].

Over half his offending has been the commission of dishonesty offences. Of the balance, nearly a quarter of all offences are traffic related and the remainder are drug related, as well as breaches of bail or what may be regarded, or what sometimes are referred to as street offences. He has unfortunately three offences of possessing a knife without excuse on his record, the most recent worryingly is on 5 October 2023.

Mr Hope has not complied very well with community based orders. As noted, his compliance with bail obligations has been unsatisfactory, but intermittent, within his lengthy criminal history. He has also, as noted, had suspended sentences breached. In 2010 he breached an intensive drug rehabilitation order in Queensland, leading to the termination of the order. This was, it may be noted, over 25 years ago, although obviously it is of concern in the current context.

He did breach a good behaviour order made in July 2019 when he continued to fail to report as directed. During his most recent criminal offending, he was granted bail, but breaches, particularly of reporting subsequently led to revocation and his return to custody. He has had a number of negative incidents in custody in Canberra since 2016, though the last noted was in 2019. No negative behaviour has been noted during his current period of custody, and as noted is employed while there.

Mr Hope has acknowledged his offending which he said was substantially due to his illicit drug use which he had consumed before offending. He did not attempt to minimise or justify his offending. He expressed a 'sincere and strong willingness to engage in a structured alcohol, tobacco and other drug (ATOD) program, highlighting his dedication to seeking assistance and support'. He demonstrated enthusiasm during the assessment process for the suitability assessments and appeared only motivated and actively engaged. He did ask questions about a treatment order and appeared to understand the answers.

Current Sentencing Practice

One of the mandatory considerations to which a court is required to have consideration when sentencing an offender is the current sentencing practice (see section 33(1)ZA of the Sentencing Act). As noted above, part of this has been addressed in considering the aggravating or mitigating factors that a court must, in addressing the required nature and circumstances of the offence, have regard to.

The actual sentences currently being imposed is the other part of this consideration. That can be addressed in two ways. The first is through the ACT sentencing database which the territory has facilitated to have had established. This records many of the sentences that are imposed in the territory in both this court and the ACT Magistrates' Court. The database does include some relevant information such as pleas and whether there are prior offences, but however does not include all the information that can identify the comparability of the sentences there recorded of the initial case. Thus, the court relevantly said in R v Elphick:

The limitations of sentencing statistics are well known. However, for what they are worth, sentencing statistics show that, in relation to sentences imposed by the Supreme Court, when the penalty that is imposed is imprisonment, … (b), the offence of burglary usually results in a sentence of between 12 months' and three years and six months' imprisonment; … (e), the offence of theft usually results in a sentence of six to 18 months' imprisonment.

As to the limitations in the sentencing database (see R v Massey (No 2)). The other method of identifying current sentencing practice is to refer to decisions of the court. These are cases where the similarities of the offending and the personal circumstance of the offender are sufficiently similar so that the sentence imposed can be used as 'a yardstick', (R v Pham), to assist in achieving and maintaining the important sentencing value of consistency. It is important, however, to note that other sentences 'illustrate, although not define, the possible range of sentences available', (Highly v The Queen).

Ms Priestly provided a table of cases which was said may be considered comparable. This was very helpful. They were R v Review; R v Antonovic (No 3); R v Reid; R v Vetchy. It is to be noted that a Crown appeal in the decision of R v Ruwhiu was dismissed (R v Rruwhiu). In this case, the burglary was of a commercial premises and the offender pleaded guilty and property was taken. Unfortunately the facts in R v Vetchy are not stated so it is quite difficult to assess real comparability, though as Mr Vetchy was co offender to Mr Reid, some of the facts can be ascertained from R v Reid.

The amount of property taken in the various cases varied widely. In two, damage was done on entry. The offenders, however, varied in age from 35 to 48 years old. Their criminal histories were also different. Mr Reid was said to be 'assisted by psychological intervention'. The sentences for burglary range from 24 months' imprisonment to six months' imprisonment. All sentences of imprisonment were served by a non custodial item, save in R v Review, where Mr Review was also convicted of aggravated robbery as well, leading to a longer sentence overall for which a short non parole period was set. These decisions provided some helpful information which will be taken into account.

Consideration

The court's task in sentencing is to impose a sentence that is just and adequate in all the circumstances (see Singh v The Queen). To do that, the court must take into account all relevant factors, ignoring all irrelevant factors, and synthesising them, many of which can point in different directions into the sentence. This is described as using an instinctive synthesis (Markarian v The Queen).

The process is generally assisted in this jurisdiction, as the Legislature has in section 7 of the Sentencing Act, provided the purposes for which a sentence may be imposed. Burglary is a serious offence which disturbs the peace of the community, invading spaces that should be safe, and theft deprives people and businesses of the property, causing loss and inconvenience, and often the loss of property for which they have worked hard. Thus, punishment, to show that there are serious consequences for such serious offences, is appropriate for the behaviours that the Legislature has, through the maximum penalties, identified as serious offences.

Such a sentence will also denounce the conduct, and while there is some debate and the conditions are not always conducive to its achievement, it may also deter others who might be minded to commit such offences from doing so. The sentence may also deter Mr Hope, though his criminal record and prior conduct does not suggest that it has had that effect to date. It will, however, need to make him accountable for his crimes which he has acknowledged. Of course, the sentence must acknowledge the harm done to the victim, though that is more complicated as there are no victim impact statements to identify that other than, in the most general of concerns, that the court can know. There is some place, especially here, for rehabilitation to play a part, and that will significantly contribute to what all of these matters are directed towards, namely the protection of the community.

Mr Hope pleaded guilty in the ACT Magistrates' Court. He did not first plead not guilty and so no brief of evidence was required to be prepared by the prosecution. That was of great utilitarian benefit. He pleaded at the sixth mention, but Ms Le Couteur submitted, without challenge, that two adjournment were required to enable the prosecution to meet its obligations of disclosure. This requires also careful consideration.

It was, thus, properly to be considered a reasonably early plea of guilty with significant utilitarian value. While the case against Mr Hope was quite strong with CCTV footage of the burglary and theft, and later of Mr Hope as identified in the same apparent clothes and with some of the stolen goods found in his apartment when he searched, it cannot be said to be overwhelming. Accordingly, the court has a discretion under section 35 of the Sentencing Act to apply a significant discount for the plea. No reasons were suggested as to why this discretion should not be exercised in Mr Hope's favour and it will be.

Mr Hope was, at the time of the offending, on bail for other offences later dealt with in the ACT Magistrates' Court. Bail is a form of conditional liberty. That is, it is the court's decision to permit Mr Hope to be in the community, not in custody, pending the finalisation of the relevant criminal charges. It is conditional liberty for it is subject conditions, including that he not commit further offences. While the abuse of that liberty by Mr Hope does not mean that the objective seriousness of the offences then committed is aggravated. It does, however, require a more severe sentence as explained in R v Poi.

Mr Hope's plea of guilty is also recognised as some expression of remorse. It is not a particularly significant expression of that important response to his offending behaviour. Nevertheless, taken with other matters, it is relevant. He has described his offending as 'unnecessary', and did not attempt to minimise or justify it. He has also expressed a very strong wish to engage in rehabilitation. There is some quite limited remorse that he has therefore shown which needs to be taken into account.

Mr Hope did start using his drug of choice, heroin, at an adult age. He did however start his use of drugs with cannabis at age 16. Though older than many of those who come before the courts, and whose drug use starts after often much earlier than this, it is nevertheless at an age when he cannot be expected to bring a mature appreciation of the consequences of what he was doing. It was crystal clear that drug use, triggering or causing offending, is not a matter of mitigation. The circumstances of the introduction of drug use can, however, moderate an offender's moral culpability (see Valentini). Thus, the circumstances, including the age of introduction to drug use, can be relevant.

Mr Hope did suffer a significant motor vehicle collision and this, it was submitted by Ms Le Couteur, escalated his use, leading to non prescribed opiates and on to heroin. Some limited moderation in his moral culpability can be afforded to him because of his somewhat early introduction and the motor vehicle collision and pain mitigation thereafter. He has, however, a poor criminal record, including a number of prior offences of the kind for which he now must be sentenced. It is important that he not be punished twice for past offences, but clearly leniency that might otherwise be available, is denied him (see R v Steen).

It was submitted by Ms Le Couteur that part of the cause of his prior offending is from homelessness, though some of his offending appears to predate that. That issue was not subject to more submissions than a passing reference that it would need careful consideration before it could justify any significant moderation of sentence.

In addition to all these matters, it is also of course necessary to take into account, when coming to the instinctive synthesis, that the court has also taken into account the facts and objective circumstances of the offences and Mr Hope's personal circumstances. Nevertheless, having regard to all the factors, and after considering all the relevant alternatives, it is clear that no other sentence than the sentence of imprisonment is appropriate and required section 10 of the Sentencing Act.

There are, of course, two offences for which a sentence must be imposed. A just and adequate sentence must be imposed on each of them, but the terms of each must be carefully considered to ensure that Mr Hope is not punished twice for the same criminality. The court must also consider whether the sentences should be wholly or partly concurrent with each other. Here, the fact that one offence is the theft of the property for which Mr Hope entered the premises as a trespasser, as noted above this requires significant concurrency. The value, both monetary and otherwise, and the fact that the majority of the stolen property was not recovered, will require some cumulation.

The court must then consider the length of the total sentence at which this process has arrived to ensure that the principle of totality is respected. In this case, that includes the fact that Mr Hope has been serving a sentence of imprisonment for other offences continuously since 24 April 2023. That is more than seven months ago. Thus, it is important that the sentence will not be excessive and leave open the realistic prospect of reform of Mr Hope, and to maintain his wish to reconnect with his children, and so that he can return to employment and to the community where he can realise his potential as he desires.

While this may result in what some see as a degree of leniency in the concurrency of the sentence and some moderation of the severity, it is important that the total criminality of Mr Hope is a central factor, but so is his commitment to his rehabilitation and his realisation of the need to address his major risk factors, his drug dependence, as well as his other personal circumstances.

Thus, while the offence must be proportionate to Mr Hope's culpability for the offending, and its criminality, acknowledging the effect of his crime on the victim and the community. It must also have regard to Mr Hope's personal circumstances and the value of his reform both to himself and to the community.

Mr Hope, please stand.

I convict you of burglary and sentence you to 14 months' imprisonment to commence on 24 October 2023 and end on 23 December 2024. Had you not pleaded guilty I would have sentenced you to 18 months' imprisonment.

I convict you of theft and sentence you to nine months' imprisonment to commence on 24 July 2024 and end on 23 April 2025. That is to be cumulative as to four months on the sentence for burglary. Had you not pleaded guilty I would have sentenced you to 12 months' imprisonment. Please be seated.

Mr Hope has been sentenced to a total of 18 months' imprisonment. He has, as noted above, sought that any sentence of imprisonment be served by a treatment order. There are other ways in which the sentence could be served but given Mr Hope's request and the value of his rehabilitation to the community, it is appropriate to consider that first and only consider other options if it is not suitable for him to serve his sentence in that way.

In order to consider whether a treatment order be made, there are two matters:  is he eligible and if so, is it suitable, including is it appropriate that the sentence of imprisonment be suspended and whether there are suitable arrangements for the administration of the treatment order which are practicable. The eligibility requirements are set out in sections 12A and 80S of the Sentencing Act. Those matters under section 80S of the Sentencing Act, however, are really the question of suitability and can be addressed when that is considered.

The eligibility criteria set out in section 12A of the Sentencing Act will first be considered in the following way. Mr Hope has pleaded guilty to each of the offences of which he has been convicted and both are eligible offences. Mr Hope has been sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment for the primary offence of burglary. This is greater than the minimum period for which an offender is eligible. The total sentence, including that for the associated offence of a theft, is 18 months' imprisonment and that is less than the maximum period for which a sentence is eligible, namely four years.

The suitability assessments both show a long and entrenched drug use and this was not challenged. The suitability assessments of Alcohol and Drug Services assess him as 'highly likely to have a severe substance use disorder.'  The court accepts that Mr Hope is dependent on heroin.

Both suitability assessments record his report that he was using drugs on the day of his offending and that he attributed this offending to his drug use. There was no challenge to this assertion. It is to some extent corroborated by the unchallenged statement he made to the author of the suitability assessments, his assessment of Drug and Alcohol Service that 'his memory of events is limited to the impact of heroin.'  The court accepts that Mr Hope's drug dependency substantially contributed to his offending.

Mr Hope has lived in Canberra for over seven years, has not expressed a current wish to leave, though his parents are in Queensland. It is not clear where his children are. The court can accept that he will remain in Canberra for the period of the sentence he is to serve.

Mr Hope has signed the prescribed form of consent to the making of a treatment order. The suitability assessments reported without challenge that he had had explained to him the treatment order and his obligations under it. The suitable assessments Alcohol and Drug Services also noted that he had the opportunity to ask questions about the treatment order. There was no suggestion that he did not have any questions answered and the answers were ones that he likely understood. This is confirmed by his significant on the prescribed consent form.

The court accepts that he has given informed consent. Accordingly, Mr Hope is eligible for a treatment order to be made for him to serve the sentence of imprisonment imposed today.

The suitability assessment of ACT Corrective Services recommends that Mr Hope is unsuitable because of his criminal record and response to previous court orders, noting his 'substantial noncompliance with community based orders,' and which led to the opinion that 'he will not be able to comply with the rigid requirements' of a treatment order.

Ms Le Couteur submitted that Mr Hope's previous noncompliance must be seen in the context of his prior lack of drug rehabilitation treatment. This will be different under the regime of a treatment order. His prior noncompliance appears on the evidence to be substantially but not completely through non contact for supervision. This will be less possible in the context of a residential drug rehabilitation program where more continuous supervision will be imposed.

He has also, however, committed further offences while on community based orders but that was again generally but not completely when he was not under such intensive supervision, including monitoring of his abstinence from drug use. This will be included in the residential drug rehabilitation program. Given the curfew and intensity of programs, the likelihood of further offending is much reduced.

The main matter of concern is the cancellation of the drug rehabilitation order of the Queensland Drug Court in 2010. This is now nearly 14 years ago. Up to then, he had had only relatively short experience of custody, mostly in South Australia, and also a suspended sentence in Queensland at that time, though that suspended sentence was revoked and he did spend some months in custody.

Since then, he has been sentenced to a number of further terms of imprisonment, including but not limited to a sentence of 18 months with a non parole period of nine months, two terms of seven months and term of six months, as well as a number of shorter periods. These experiences, it appears, have been in part influenced by his homelessness, unemployment and antisocial peers.

He has shown in part that he can avoid criminality. For instance, no offences were recorded between mid 1998 and late 2000 and though one minor offence, driving an unregistered vehicle, there are no offences recorded between 2002 and 2005 and 2007 and 2009.

He has also the motivation that he wishes to reconnect with his children and the longer he leaves that, the more difficult and more unlikely it is to be able to happen.

The comparative circumstances do not guarantee that he will comply with a treatment order better on this occasion but the indications are quite generally positive.

The residential rehabilitation proposed will resolve a number of issues that, together with his application for accommodation in the Justice Housing project at the end of residential drug rehabilitation, will address his homelessness. The program is intensive and supervised with regular drug testing. The residential program has a curfew. He will, of course, be with other users of drugs but the significant impact of whom will also be that they are too seeking rehabilitation, beginning their journey of becoming prosocial.

The case plan provides suitable arrangements for the administration of the treatment order. The arrangements, being that of residential drug rehabilitation, are suitable and in that context, rather than a completely community based order, the court accepts that it is suitable for the sentence of imprisonment to be suspended and Mr Hope to be subject to a treatment order. The court is accordingly satisfied that a treatment order is a suitable disposition for Mr Hope.

Mr Hope, please stand.

I make a drug and alcohol treatment order under section 12A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) for you in respect of the primary offence of burglary of which you have been convicted and for which you have been sentenced to one year and two months' imprisonment. The order is extended to the offence of theft of which you have also been convicted and for which you have been sentenced and which is an associated offence of the primary offence.

It is noted that convictions and sentences imposed for the primary and associated offences have been recorded and are hereby incorporated into the drug and alcohol treatment order in the custodial part of the order. The drug and alcohol treatment order is for one year, four months and 18 days from today, 6 December 2023, to 23 April 2025.

The treatment and supervision part of the drug and alcohol treatment order will be for one year from today, 6 December 2023, to 5 December 2024. The custodial part of the drug and alcohol treatment order for the primary and associated offences is hereby suspended under section 80W of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 from today, 6 December 2023, until 23 April 2025.

Under section 80ZA of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005, you are to be required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender's good behaviour obligations under section 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) from the day after the end of the treatment and supervision part of the drug and alcohol treatment order, 6 December 2024, until the end of the total sentence, 23 April 2025, with a probation condition that you accept supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or his delegate for the period of the undertaking, or such lesser period as the person supervising you considers appropriate, and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising you, including as to alcohol and drug testing, counselling and treatment.

For the treatment and supervision part of the drug and alcohol treatment order, the core conditions of the order set out in section 81 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 are hereby imposed.

You are to travel directly from this court today to Canberra Recovery Services in Fyshwick and admit yourself to the residential drug rehabilitation program at that facility by 1.00 pm today, 6 December 2023. You are directed to complete the residential drug rehabilitation program at Canberra Recovery Services, to not leave the facility until you have completed the course and to comply with all the directions of the person in charge of the program and all the rules of the program and the facility.

Should you leave or be discharged from the program before completing it, you are to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4.00 pm on the next business day with a view to having your drug and alcohol treatment order reviewed.

You are to undertake any program, treatment or counselling, alcohol and drug testing or case management that may be required by any member of the treatment and supervision team and obey all reasonable directions of any member of that team about where you reside, with whom you associate and your attendance from time to time.

You are to comply with any directions of the court from time to time about attendance in court or in person or by electronic means, and you are directed to sign a sealed copy of this order and an undertaking to comply with the order and any obligations under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) for the period that this order is in force before you leave the court precinct.

You are directed to appear by electronic means in court on Friday, 15 December 2023, at 12.30 pm.

Direct remarks

Mr Hope, that's a lot words. You probable understand most of it because (a) you've been around the courts for a long time now, (b) most of it's about you and (c) most of it's about what you've done and what you did and where you were, but I'm obliged to explain the order to you.

So I've said this was not a really bad burglary but it was a bad burglary. It was something that you shouldn't do and I hope you understand now that you shouldn't do. The theft was pretty serious and so all up, I've said 18 months' imprisonment, which is pretty moderate but does take into account your wish for rehabilitation and the precise nature of the circumstances both of yourself and of the actual offending.

I've said that your commitment to rehabilitation, and I hope you can translate those words into action and we’ll see in the coming months, but that commitment permits me in all the circumstances to make a drug and alcohol treatment order. That treatment order will be intensive treatment.

You're in residential rehabilitation. You'll be required to attend classes, counselling, case management. It will challenge you. It will challenge your thinking and your understanding. It will trigger you and it will provide you with challenges. If you overcome them you will get stronger and it will be easier to overcome them as you go by, but you will have to put effort into it and you will have to draw on all the strength you can to make sure that you make it work.

If it becomes difficult, then don’t run away. That's the worst thing you can do. If you run away and people have. Most of them have been found. There are a couple that we're still looking for but most of them been found, and the almost inevitability is you'll have to go back to prison and serve the rest of the 18 months in jail. So that's not said to fright you because you've been to jail. It probably doesn’t frighten you given the number of times you've been there.

Hopefully, you're now saying, 'That's not where I want to be.'  Think back to what you did on the trawlers. Think forward to your kids and having some of the things in life that you can have in the community but you can't have in custody. Think of what you want to be and what you want to do. Focus on that and it will be easier.

But if it's hard, then talk to your case managers. You'll have a case manager in CRS but you'll also have a case manager from ACT Health and you'll have a corrections officer. They’re there, yes, to supervise, yes, to monitor, yes, to check you're doing all right, but they’re also a very valuable resource. They’re very professional people and they can assist you. They can help you where you might find some assistance if they can’t provide that assistance themselves and that you need to think about. Now, that's not always easy for people to do, to open themselves up and to explain what’s going on and to seek help, appear being vulnerable, but it's really important in this process.

The other thing that's critically important is honesty. Of course you've got to be honest to me because if you don’t, that's a lie, that's perjury, that's an offence, right? But be honest to your counsellors, right?  Tell them actually what’s happened. Tell them what’s going on. That's the way they can help you. If you hide that from them, they can’t help you.

But it's also critically important to be honest to yourself, right?  It's very easy not to be honest to yourself. You think, 'Oh, it's only a quick snort. It's only a quick hit. No one'll find out. They won’t matter.'  Part of the reason why you're dishonest is because if you're honest, you'll feel ashamed because you know this is not what you want to do, you know this is not what you should do, you know that this is a bad thing to do.

Shame is a difficult emotion. It is hurtful but it can be helpful. It's a bit like pain. Pain knows that you've got to do something about your toe or your knee or your heart or whatever it is. It's a message. So is shame a message to say, 'Nuh, uh uh, this is not what you want to do. This is not what you should do.'  Unless you're honest with yourself you won’t feel that shame, right?  So that's really important in going forward.

And don’t feel that people, in this court anyhow, will feel any the worse. We don't like it when you breach the rules. We will sanction you. The sanctions are usually warnings or points. Each point is a day in custody. We don't send you back to custody usually until you earn seven points then we send you back for seven days. Sometimes that has to be 14 days. But we try to support you and if you're honest, the sanctions will be less anyway, because honesty is something that we do value and want to encourage. So if you're honest, you get out of it better but also it will make you easier able to manage your rehabilitation.

So don’t run away, come back. Talk to me, all right?  It's not always easy to talk to a judge but you'll find, as you see what happens in these courts on Friday mornings, you can raise things. As a judge, I've got quite a lot of power. I'm not omnipotent. There are things I can't do. I can't give you a home, for example, which is awful because homelessness is a real problem, but we’ve got some programs on foot and I can direct you towards those and I can ask our team to assist you in doing that and so on. So there are things that can be done.

Sometimes I can change the rules and things can happen that are causing you difficulties and sometimes you've just got to suck it up and that's the way it goes. But come back and talk to me and be honest.

And finally, really take this privilege. You're not spending any more time in custody unless you do the wrong thing. No more time in custody in order that you can address that drug dependency which has led you down this hole and into the AMC again and again and again, and other jails.

If you look to the future, a future where you can do things that you like in the community both in terms of work and in terms of other things, reconnect with your family, perhaps have another family. Reconnect with your family in Queensland who hate it when you're in custody and when you do the wrong thing. And time is running out for that reconnection and to do that properly. If you can do that, then you will walk out of here a proud man, a man that can say, 'I have overcome these obstacles,' and be proud of what you achieve, and the court will support you for that.

I wish you all the best for this. I hope that it works out for you and one day I hope to see you graduate. You may be seated.

THE PARTICIPANT: I understand, your Honour.